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Abstract
This paper puts forward a new test of Tiebout sorting that relies on the
exogenous time structure of recurrent local elections. The test is based on the
idea that the policy uncertainty that is associated with periodic competitive
elections should be expected to induce delay of migration, thus generating an
electoral migration cycle of relatively low rates of migration before the elec-
tions, followed by relatively high rates of migration when electoral uncertainty
is resolved. Conversely, interjurisdictional migration ows that are unrelated to
local public service provision motives ought to be orthogonal to the timing of
local elections. Empirically, I study sorting patterns across several thousands of
peninsular Italys municipalities through the increasingly turbulent 2002-2013
decade. I nd evidence of an electoral migration cycle in the sense that the
timing of internal migration ows is systematically inuenced by the schedule
of recurrent mayoral elections.
JEL classication: D72; H77; C23.
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1 Introduction
The idea of mobile households sorting across localities according to their prefer-
ences for local public services, or voting with their feet(Tiebout, 1956), has
played an important role in theoretical public economics as well as in the actual
design of decentralized government structures during the past decades (Gill and
Rodriguez-Pose, 2012).1 However, testing the impact of local public good pro-
vision on households location decisions empirically has proved di¢ cult, with
traditional econometric approaches following in either of the following two cate-
gories. The rst is a direct testing approach attempting at modelling the actual
ows of migration as a function of local provision of public goods and services
- an approach that is well know to su¤er from the endogeneity of local choices
(Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008). The second is an indirect approach verifying some
key implications of the Tiebout theory in terms of capitalization of local public
policies (taxes and expenditures) into house prices and stratication of house-
holds by income or wealth, with those implications turning out over time to
be less straightforward than was once thought (Oates, 2006). The most recent
approaches are based on structural estimation of parametric general equilibrium
models that study the sorting decisions of populations of heterogeneous agents,
where the attributes of the available choice alternatives are determined endoge-
nously as an indirect outcome of the very sorting process (Epple et al., 2001;
Kumino¤ et al., 2013).
This paper puts forward a novel and powerful test of Tiebout sorting that
relies on the exogenous time schedule of recurrent elections that is typical of
most local government arrangements in the democracies of the Western world.
The idea that the calendar of elections can have an inuence on the trajectory
of a number of key aggregate economic variables and on the making of public
1The stratication of localities as a result of sorting has spurred a heated debate too
(Bishop and Cushing, 2008).
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policy has a long tradition in economics.2 Nordhaus (1975) was the rst to
formally and inuentially argue that the fact that the government be chosen
in periodic competitive elections(Nordhaus, 1975: 185) can induce incumbent
politicians to exploit short-term macroeconomic trade-o¤s and produce political
business cycles of low pre-election unemployment rates followed by after-election
inationary pressures. Later, Rogo¤ (1990) provided a dynamic signalling in-
terpretation of the observed e¤ect of election schedules on the economy, and
focused on the timing of scal policy by noting a switch to more salient public
consumption expenditures right before the elections. Starting with Rosenberg
(1992), the subsequent literature investigated the presence of political business
cycles on local government data too, as in the recent empirical analyses of
Baleiras and Da Silva Costa (2004), Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Foremny and
Riedel (2014).
In fact, the inuence of periodic election schedules on the economy seems to
go beyond the explicit attempts by opportunistic politicians to manoeuvre tax
and expenditure policy to their own electoral advantage. Recent research found
a number of dynamic business decisions to be systematically inuenced by the
very timing of elections, irrespective or even in the opposite direction as what
political business cycles models would predict. In the presence of policy un-
certainty induced by competitive elections (regarding, for instance, what kind
of taxation, privatization, and labor-market regulation policies will be imple-
mented by the newly elected government), corporate capital expenditures and
costly-to-undo private investment appear to drop signicantly before an election
and stagnate until after the election, when political uncertainty is resolved (Julio
and Yook, 2012; 2014). Such incentive for delay of large investments with high
costs of reversal would partly o¤set any attempt of opportunistic election-year
2Drazen (2001) reviewed the voluminous theoretical and empirical political business cycle
literature that appeared in the previous quarter century.
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manipulation, and would explain the little empirical support for the political
business cycle idea (Canes-Wrone and Park, 2012).
Indeed, the existence of a register of periodic competitive elections where
candidates with di¤erent views of the world run for o¢ ce implies that scal
policy and public good provision are subject to hard to predict discrete changes
over time, with those changes tending to occur in synchrony with the xed elec-
toral calendar. Moreover, government breaks and subsequent policy reversals
in a local government structure might have consequences that seem to have
been overlooked so far. In a world of mobile households that are willing to
exit to consume their preferred bundles of public services elsewhere, the xed
time structure of local elections seems likely to a¤ect the timing of interjuris-
dictional migration too. In particular, if we interpret the migration decision
as an irreversible investment, the predetermined election schedule might give
rise to a sorting cycle, with residents that are willing to shop elsewhere for the
public services they require (e.g., schooling for their children, or care homes for
their elderly relatives) delaying their exit decision to after an uncertain elec-
tion. Plausibly, the reection of the calendar of local elections into the timing
of interjurisdictional migration ows will tend to be amplied by the policy
radicalization that is usually observed in times of economic crises, with incum-
bents defeats being followed by signicant local policy changes. Conversely,
interjurisdictional migration ows that are unrelated to local public service pro-
vision motives ought to be orthogonal to the timing and the outcomes of local
elections.
The main objective of this paper is to test whether the schedule of local
elections - an exogenous institutional feature in most environments, including
the one we analyze empirically here - has an inuence on the timing of migration
decisions. I thus allow the xed revenue-expenditure pattern that is typical of
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a strict city managerinterpretation of the Tiebout model (Oates, 2006) to be
subject to periodic perturbations at exogenous election dates, and verify em-
pirically if the pattern of households sorting across the available locations is
a¤ected by the time structure of municipal elections. The coexistence, using
Hirschmans (1970) celebrated terminology, of a voice option that is dictated by
an arguably exogenous schedule of periodic mayoral elections and of a roughly
continuous exit option that is available in every year of the term of o¢ ce cre-
ates the conditions for an electoral migration cycle,where the timing of local
elections tends to have an impact on the timing of moving decisions.
I formalize the electoral migration cycle idea within a simple model whose
basic insight can be traced back to the models of irreversible investment in
the presence of uncertainty of Cukierman (1980), Bernanke (1983) and Rodrik
(1991), and whose structure is similar to Canes-Wrone and Park (2012). In
the multi-jurisdictional structure of the model, migration is a costly irreversible
choice, and its return depends on the outcome of an uncertain election. The
degree of electoral uncertainty constitutes a potentially important determinant
of the likelihood of unsatised households to move in order to consume their
desired mix of public services: the more uncertain is the election, the higher
is the gain for residents to wait until after the election before making their
migration decision, when such high uncertainty will be resolved, thus reducing
migration before the elections. Conversely, low electoral uncertainty makes early
exit the only credible way of increasing ones welfare. As a result, the probability
of migrating out of a locality tends to be higher in the aftermath than on the
eve of a close election, that is after the electoral uncertainty concerning the type
of public good that will be provided has been resolved. In empirical terms, the
above reasoning o¤ers a novel way of testing the Tiebout hypothesis of voting
with ones feet: if householdssorting decisions were not a¤ected by local public
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good provision over which local communities vote recurrently, then the timing
of local elections would simply have no impact on internal migration rates, and
no electoral migration cycle would arise. The advantage of an empirical strategy
using the exogenous timing of staggered local elections to explain the pattern
of interjurisdictional sorting is that it does not su¤er from the endogeneity
problems that plague typical empirical tests of Tiebout sorting.
I perform the empirical analysis on a large dataset of Italian local govern-
ments. I make use of the staggered election schedule to rst test the hypothesis
that the xed timing of recurrent municipal elections a¤ects the timing of in-
ternal migration ows, thus generating an electoral migration cycle. Next, I
construct a number of indicators of electoral uncertainty at each of over 15,000
municipal elections, and test the e¤ect of those electoral uncertainty indicators
on migration decisions. As far as the rst objective of the empirical analysis is
concerned, I nd robust evidence of an electoral migration cycle: the estimation
results based on over 80,000 municipal-year observations point to signicantly
higher outmigration rates in the years following than in those preceding mu-
nicipal elections, compatibly with the hypothesis of a role of local public good
provision in inuencing householdsexit decisions. As for the second objective
of the empirical analysis, I nd that electoral uncertainty in terms of the degree
to which an election is contested is a key determinant of exit decisions: uncon-
tested elections are accompanied by higher rates of outmigration, conrming the
hypothesis that the early exercise of the more dramatic exit option is more likely
when the more exible voice option has little or no chance of being e¤ective.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a stylized
theoretical model and derives a number of empirical predictions. Section 3
illustrates the institutional framework and the 2002-2013 panel dataset. Section
4 studies empirically the patterns of sorting across Italian municipalities in
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search of evidence of an electoral migration cycle. Section 5 explores the impact
of electoral uncertainty on exit patterns. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Migrating under uncertainty
I succinctly formalize the mechanism giving rise to an electoral migration cycle
in a local government structure by means of a simple model whose basic insight
can be traced back to the irreversible investment models of Cukierman (1980),
Bernanke (1983) and Rodrik (1991), and whose structure is roughly similar to
Canes-Wrone and Park (2012). In those models, increased uncertainty on the
returns to an investment (due, for instance, to uncertainty on future scal, trade,
and exchange-rate policies) causes a decrease in the current level of investment
even by risk-neutral investors by making it more protable to wait longer and
gather more information on the distribution of the relevant parameters. In par-
ticular, the incentive to delay an investment depends inversely on the precision
with which the uncertain outcome can be predicted and on the cost of delay
(in terms of foregone prots), and it depends directly on the degree to which
the optimal features of the investment (e.g., the size or location of a plant) are
a¤ected by the realization of the stochastic event.
Here, I consider the irreversible investment that is represented by households
migration decisions in the presence of uncertainty on local election outcomes.
I analyze a decentralized structure of government, where each jurisdiction n =
1; :::; N is inhabited by overlapping generations of agents that are born of either
of two types -  = fl; rg - in terms of their preferences for local public goods.
Denoting by u(xn) the utility function of a voter of type , and by xn = fl; rg
the public good type that is supplied in the jurisdiction where the voter resides,
I assume that: u(xn) = u if xn = , and u(xn) = u if xn 6= , with u 
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u u > 0.3 In each locality, expenditure on the public good is entirely funded by
lump-sum federal grants,4 and the public good to be provided, l or r, is selected
by majority voting.5 Recurrent elections are simultaneously held at the end of
every period in all localities.6 A voter of type  always votes for -type public
goods, and newly born individuals acquire the right to vote on local public good
provision either in the locality they were born in or in the locality they decide
to migrate to.
Any resident experiencing xn 6=  can either stay in the locality where he
is born and content with low utility u, or migrate to a locality where xn = 
by incurring a moving cost c. Moving amounts to an irreversible investment
(e.g., due to changing house and job) that can either be made immediately,
or be delayed at the cost of renouncing to consume the desired public good in
the current period. There exists at least one locality j providing the public
good xj =  for any voter-type , and the cost of moving is unrelated to the
geographic distance between two jurisdictions. Agents do not take into account
the e¤ects of their own movements on future local policies.
When a voter is born, nature selects  (voters type) and c (cost of moving).
Of course, no voter moves for whom xn =  in his own jurisdiction of residence
if the cost of moving is positive. On the other hand, consider the moving
calculus of an individual whose preferences do not match the majority of his
communitys preferences (xn 6= ), and assume rst that no uncertainty exists
about the outcome of elections, meaning that public good xn will be provided
with certainty in the next period too. If an individual moves immediately to
3For instance, the two public goods might refer to business versus household services re-
spectively.
4To simplify things, no local taxes exist. The only local choice concerns which of the two
public good types to provide.
5 In principle, as in Kollman et al. (1997), polities might have to take a binary position on
several issues. I focus on a one-dimensional and binary issue for simplicity.
6This is not the case in the empirical set-up I analyze below, where the fortunate circum-
stances of a staggered election schedule play a fundamental role in identifying the electoral
migration cycle separately from common year e¤ects.
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a locality providing the desired public good , utility is u   c in the current
period, and u in the next period, with  < 1 a time discount factor. If he
delays exit to after the election, he has low utility u in the current period, and
 (u  c) in the future period. As shown in equation (1) below, it is preferable
to delay migration if the cost of delay - that is, the gain in utility u that he
would get by migrating immediately - is smaller than the gain of delay, that in
this simple, no uncertainty case is represented by the di¤erence in the cost of
migration between moving today (c) and moving in the next period (c):
u < c (1  ) (1)
Consider now the case of an uncertain election, and let  denote the prob-
ability that the election provokes a policy reversal.7 If the individual migrates
immediately to a locality providing xj = , he has utility u   c in the current
period, and will have utility  [(1  )u+ u] in the future period, after the
election: utility in the next period is high if no policy change occurs, and is low
in case of a policy change occurring with probability . If the individual delays
exit to after the election, he has low utility u in the current period, and will
have utility  [u+ (1  ) (u  c)] in the future period, where the rst term
(u) picks the high utility level that the voter obtains without migrating in case
of a policy change in the own jurisdiction that occurs with probability ; the
second term (1  ) (u  c) captures the utility level that can instead be ob-
tained by exercising the costly exit option after the election if no policy change
occurred in the own jurisdiction. As a result, the individual delays migration
7 I assume for the moment that the probability of a policy change is the same  in all
localities, including the own jurisdiction of residence, though it is possible to generalize the
analysis to heterogeneous degrees of electoral uncertainty across localities with no substantial
consequences. Moreover,  could alternatively be interpreted as the probability that a restric-
tive scal policy (a scal consolidation) be opportunistically implemented after the election
that reduces residentsutility to u. The fundamental conclusions of the model would be the
same under this alternative interpretation of electoral uncertainty.
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if the cost of delay is smaller than a threshold cost level that accounts for the
uncertain election result:
u < c
1  (1  )
1   (2)
Equation (2) shows that delaying migration to after the election is more
likely if the cost of migration (c) is high, if the cost of delaying (u = u  u) is
low, and if the probability of a change of government () is high.
3 Institutional framework and dataset
The empirical analysis relies on a panel dataset of variables that are measured
at the lowest (municipal) of the three tiers of the Italian local government struc-
ture.8 The municipal level of government is in fact the oldest administrative
jurisdiction in Italy, and municipal authorities - whose role as an autonomous
and representative level of government is explicitly dened in the Constitu-
tion - are statutorily responsible, irrespective of their size, for the provision of
a number of crucial public services in two main areas.9 The rst area con-
cerns environment-related services and includes urban public transport, road
maintenance and cleaning, waste collection and management, water and sewer
services, environmental monitoring and protection, planning, zoning (including
location of new productive plants), and management of industrial, agricultural
and touristic infrastructures located within the municipal boundaries. The sec-
ond area concerns personal social services including social care to the elderly and
disabled, organization and management of pre-school services (kindergartens),
cultural services (libraries, museums, sports infrastructures), and local police
services.
8The two upper tiers are constituted by twenty regions and over one-hundred provinces
respectively.
9The sole exception is the possibility (or obligation in some instances) for small-sized
municipalities to set up an intermunicipal cooperation institution for the provision of public
services that require a minimum scale of production
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The municipal level of government is highly fragmented, with average pop-
ulation size of around 7,000 inhabitants. While the total number of municipal-
ities exceeds 8,000, we focus on the 6,702 municipalities that are situated in
the fteen state lawcontinental Italys regions. We therefore exclude the two
island regions (Sardegna and Sicilia) and the three small regions in the Alps
(Valle dAosta, Trentino-Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia) that are entitled
to larger autonomy - home rule- and that establish own limits and obligations
on municipal governments located within their boundaries.
Most of the 6,702 municipalities that I track for over a decade are small. The
number of cities above 100,000 inhabitants is only around 40, just two of them
exceeding one million residents, with more than half of localities having less than
3,000 residents. For each municipality, I use yearly observations over the 2002 to
2013 time span on the demographic structure of the population residing there.
Moreover, I observe the total number of people that outmigrated during each
year. I have information on whether they migrated to other Italian localities
or to foreign countries, but I have no information on their specic destination
(table 1). Overall, the dataset has over 80,000 observations. All demographic
variables are available from the Italian national statistics institute (ISTAT).
Table 2 reports the timing of elections, the number of municipalities going
to the polls in any of the years 2002-2013, and a number of election statistics
including the number of mayor candidates and the win margin of the elected
mayor with respect to the opponent. The win margin is computed as the di¤er-
ence in votes between the elected mayor and his most voted opponent, divided
by the number of total votes. It ranges from 0 in case of a tie to 100 in an
uncontested election.
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4 Election timing and migration
The rst hypothesis that I test is whether the timing of municipal elections has
an inuence on the timing of intermunicipal migration. The schedule of local
elections described in table 2 o¤ers the opportunity to test this hypothesis by
exploiting the arguably exogenous and staggered nature of municipal voting in
Italy.
The more than a decade-long time span that I analyze saw the Italian econ-
omy move from moderate economic growth in the early 2000s to a deep and
prolonged recession during the late 2000s and the early 2010s, and the average
internal migration rates reported in table 1 show a moderate increase over the
decade, from below 2.5% to close to 3%. Table 1 shows that foreign outmigra-
tion has been rising considerably over the decade too, a phenomenon that is
mostly due to young unemployed searching for jobs abroad. The size of foreign
migration appears negligible, though, relative to internal migration ows, and I
disregard it in the rest of the analysis.
The empirical specication (3) below has the rate of outmigration from local-
ity n to any other Italian locality in year t (mnt) as the dependent variable (ow
of people that are cancelled from the local list of residents because of moving
to other Italian municipalities from January 1st to December 31st, expressed as
a percentage of resident population on January 1st of each year), and controls
for the macroeconomic trends mentioned above by including year e¤ects (yt):
mnt =
LX
l=1
le(t  l)nt + hn + yt + "nt (3)
The staggered electoral schedule, with a considerable number of municipal-
ities having elections in each year, allows me to identify the e¤ect of the timing
of voting (parameter l in (3)) separately from common year e¤ects. In par-
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ticular, to test the impact of election timing on sorting, I build a vector of L
dummy variables e(t  l) that equal 1 if there was an election in the l = 1; :::; L
calendar years preceding the migration measurement year t in municipality n.
I start from L = 1 and keep on adding further lagged election year dummies
for up to an election having taken place four years back (L = 4). In the latter
case, and given that the conventional term of o¢ ce lasts ve years, the fourth
year after an election is in fact the eve of the next election and, according to
the electoral migration model, should record low rates of outmigration. Finally,
I build a composite after-electiondummy variable that equals 1 if the observa-
tion on internal migration refers to either of the two years following a municipal
election. In order to consistently estimate (3) and control for locality-specic
time-invariant traits (hn), I take deviations from municipal-level means in all
specications.
The estimation results on the 2002-2013 panel dataset are reported in tables
3, 4, and 5. The results in table 3 are based on a standard specication that uses
the entire panel of over 80,000 observations, and includes xed locality and year
e¤ects, along with the above discussed dummy variables picking the timing of the
elections. In all instances, it turns out that the timing of elections signicantly
inuences the intensity of migration out of a municipality: migration is higher
in the year following an election - column (3.2) - and, to an even larger extent, in
the subsequent year - column (3.3). The estimates including dummies for three
and four years after an election reveal that the rate of outmigration reverts to
the average in the third year, and turns signicantly negative in the fourth year,
that is the year corresponding to the eve of the next election in a regular ve-
years term of o¢ ce. Figure 1 depicts the outmigration trajectory between two
elections - the electoral migration cycle - that the estimation results in column
(3.5) suggest to be typical. Given the average rates of outmigration reported in
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table 1 - percentage of total resident population moving to other Italian localities
during a year - the estimates in table 3 suggest that interjurisdictional migration
is over two percent larger in post-election years than in pre-election ones.
The results in table 4 are based on a specication that includes an additional
linear time trend that is specic of the regions of the North of Italy to capture the
feature that those regions tend to be net recipients of migrants from the regions
of the South. The trend is highly signicant and points to a steady decline in
migration rates out of the municipalities in the North regions. This is partly due
to increasing population in those municipalities as a result of migration from
the South regions. As for the role of the timing of elections, the results on the
election year dummies are virtually unchanged, and conrm the presence of an
electoral migration cycle as found in table 3.
Finally, table 5 excludes from the analysis all municipalities that did not
abide to a regular, ve-years interval between elections. An early election needs
to be called either if the mayor resigns, or if he is no longer backed by a majority
of the council members. In addition, the Ministry of Interior can command
early elections if a council passes unlawful acts or incurs in excessive decits.
The intensity of the phenomenon can be gauged by looking at the di¤erence
between the number of municipalities having elections at a ve-years interval in
table 2. Over the twelve years, the phenomenon involves about a thousand out
of over 15,000 elections. In fact, those early election observations might bias the
results if the early call for elections and the subsequent rates of migration are
in fact a¤ected by common unobservables (say, the emergence of a corruption
scandal or of a sizeable local debt determining both the early election call and
an unusually large outow of residents). The evidence reported in table 5 is
virtually the same as the one in tables 3 and 4, thus conrming the signicant
impact of the timing of elections on migration in this restricted, xed election
14
schedule sample.
5 Electoral uncertainty
As sketched in section 2, the mechanism that is hypothesized to drive the delay
of migration to after the elections is the uncertainty that is associated with
competitive mayoral races. The closer an election outcome is expected to be,
the stronger is the incentive to wait and learn the outcome of the election, thus
delaying the decision to migrate. In order to explicitly test that hypothesis, I
would need an as accurate as possible proxy of closeness of an election outcome
(Simonovits, 2012). Based on the available information on Italian municipal
elections, I can rely on an ex post indicator of electoral closenss, and on an ex
ante one. The former is the win margin of the elected mayor that is summarized
in table 2. It is built as the di¤erence in votes between the elected mayor and
its most voted opponent, expressed as a percentage of the votes earned by the
most voted candidate. The mean and median win margin are around 37% and
30% of the votes of the elected mayor respectively. Ideally, an ex ante measure
of expected vote di¤erence between the two most popular candidates would be
preferable, but unfortunately no such polls are available for municipal elections.
The oberved win margin clearly only reveals ex post the degree of closeness of
an electoral race, and is related in an unknown way and via changes in the size
and composition of the population of voters who actually turn out to vote with
the perceived closeness before the election.10
Consequently, in order to better capture the ex ante closeness of an election,
I employ a dummy variable that equals 1 in elections that are uncontested.
Such variable has some limitations too. It is of course an accurate description
10De Paola and Scoppa (2014) focus on dual ballot elections for larger (>15,000 inhabitants)
municipalities, and use rst round vote closeness as an instrument for second round closeness
in a voter turnout equation. I cannot use that strategy here because the large majority of my
observations refer to smaller municipalities that follow a single ballot electoral system.
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of lack of competition in those local elections where a candidate runs unopposed,
and has the advantage of revealing the degree of uncertainty on the outcome of
an election before the election itself. On the other hand, its main weakness is
due to the fact that it might understimate the true number of non-competitive
outcomes by missing those races whose result is easily predictable even in the
presence of more than one candidate. In our sample, uncontested elections are
about 6% of total elections. In fact, the two electoral uncertainty indicators are
related in the sense that as the win margin increases and approaches 100% of
the votes of the elected mayor, the (ex post) win margin converges to the (ex
ante) uncontested election indicator.
As for timing, given that the term of o¢ ce lasts ve years and that the in-
cumbent can only a¤ect the date of the next election by strategically resigning
(an event that seems extremely unlikely to occur in the environment we study
here), the date of the next election can in most circumstances be assumed to
be common information throughout the length of term. On the other hand,
the degree of competition at an election becomes known to voters only in the
immediacy of an election (usually no later than a month before the date of the
election) with the formal registration and announcement of candidates. As a
result, and as long as election uncertainty plays a role in householdsmoving
decisions, low uncertainty elections should neither inuence migration deci-
sions in the years preceding an election (based on the presumption that voters
do not even know at that time whether the election will be contested or not) nor
should induce delay to after the election in order to learn its outcome. Rather,
since the news of low uncertaintyelection should have an immediate impact
on potetial movers, we would expect the rate of outmigration to be higher in
uncontested districts in the year elections are held.
Table 6 reports the estimation results of a migration equation that allows for
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an e¤ect from the two electoral uncertainty variables discussed above. I include
dummies for the year after the election, for the year in which elections are held,
and for the year before the election respectively. As for the win margin dummy,
I build a low uncertainty (large win) dummy variable equaling 1 if the ex post
win margin exceeds the median sample value of 30% of the votes of the elected
mayor, and expect low uncertainty to raise (lower) outmigration immediately
before (after) the election relative to what would happen in the proximity of
an uncertain election, that is to atten or cancel altogether any evidence of an
electoral migration cycle. I tried with a number of thresholds and report here
the results based on the median 30% win margin threshold. As argued above,
the results converge to the uncontested election dummy specication as the win
margin threshold is moved closer to 100%. Relatedly, I expect the uncontested
election dummy to inate the outmigration rate in the year when information on
the candidates running at a municipal election is spread, that is in the proximity
of the election year.
The rst column of table 6 reports the results of a specication that only has
the three election-time (before, at, after the election) dummies. The subsequent
columns include the ex post electoral uncertainty indicator - (6.2) and (6.3)
- and the ex ante one - (6.4) and (6.5). Given the long established evidence
on the importance of life-cycle motives in Tiebout sorting processes (Polachek
and Horvath, 1977), I include the demographic composition of the voting age
population in columns (6.3) and (6.4) as a potential determinant of the fraction
of people who move out (Farnham and Sevak, 2006; Epple et al., 2012; Kumino¤
et al., 2013). The demographic groups are those reported in (4):
H = f[18; 25] ; [26; 35] ; ; [46; 55] [56; 65] [66; ]g (4)
with the middle aged group [36; 45] playing the role of reference group. Migra-
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tion is expressed as the percentage of the resident population at the beginning of
the calendar year that migrates to other Italian municipalities during the year,
as in tables 3 to 5.
With the win margin set at the median threshold of 30% of the incumbents
votes, the estimation results show in this case - columns (6.2) and (6.3) - that the
low competition dummy has no signicant impact on exit/outmigration on top
of the e¤ects generated by the pure election timing (slowdown of outmigration
before the elections, followed by a rise in outmigration after the elections). On
the other hand, when employing a dummy variable for an uncontested election
(that is equivalent to raising the win margin threshold for building the low com-
petition dummy to 100%), I nd a signicant positive impact of such variable on
migration in the election year. This is compatible with the idea of an immediate
e¤ect on migration decisions as soon as news on whether elections are contested
or not are spread, and suggests that lack of competition at an election lowers the
incentive to wait and delay migration to after the election. The result is robust
to the introduction of the demographic composition of the resident population
among the potential determinants of internal migration, with younger cohorts
being found to be signicantly and expectedly more likely to exit than older
ones.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed a novel test of local public good-induced sorting that
relies on the time structure of periodic local elections as an exogenous source
of policy uncertainty. The idea is that the policy uncertainty that is induced
by competitive local elections generates an electoral migration cycle in terms of
relatively low rates of migration before the elections, followed by relatively high
rates of migration when the electoral uncertainty is resolved. On the other hand,
18
interjurisdictional migration ows that are unrelated to the provision of local
public goods ought to be orthogonal to the timing of local elections. Second, I
have explicitly investigated the role of electoral uncertainty - that I have proxied
by an ex ante proxy of electoral uncertainty (uncontested elections) and by an
ex post one (win margin) - in explaining the timing of the decision to migrate
to other localities.
I have succinctly formalized the electoral migration cycle idea within a simple
model whose basic insight can be traced back to the models of irreversible
investment in the presence of uncertainty that have been recently employed to
test the impact of electoral uncertainty on corporate investment (Canes-Wrone
and Park, 2012; Julio and Yook, 2012; 2014). Increased electoral uncertainty
causes a decrease in the level of migration before an election by making it more
protable to delay until uncertainty is resolved. The likelihood of delaying
migration to after an election is higher if the cost of migration is high, if the
cost of delay (in terms of the di¤erence in utility caused by alternative local
policies) is low, and if the degree of uncertainty on the outcome of the election
is high.
Based on a large panel dataset of migration ows across Italian municipal-
ities for over a decade, I have studied sorting patterns in a system of local
governments where elections are dictated by an exogenous periodic schedule.
The crucial identifying assumption on which the empirical analysis rests is the
exogeneity of the staggered schedule of Italian municipal elections that I can
exploit to verify the existence of an electoral migration cycle. The estimation
results point to signicantly higher outmigration rates in the years following
rather than preceding municipal elections, thus lending support to the existence
of an electorally driven cycle of sorting choices that is compatible with a role
of local public good provision in inuencing householdslocation decisions. Fi-
19
nally, lack of electoral competition (uncontested elections) is estimated to inhibit
households from delaying migration, thus reinforcing the hypothesis of exit as a
substitute for voice when minority voterschances of signicantly a¤ecting local
policy through direct political participation are feeble.
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Tables
Table 1 Outmigration from Italian municipalities
year internal foreign obs.
% pop. % pop.
2002 2.44 0.08 6,700
2003 2.54 0.11 6,701
2004 2.69 0.12 6,702
2005 2.74 0.13 6,702
2006 2.85 0.15 6,702
2007 2.81 0.12 6,702
2008 2.76 0.14 6,702
2009 2.67 0.15 6,702
2010 2.65 0.15 6,702
2011 2.75 0.15 6,699
2012 3.10 0.19 6,699
2013 2.76 0.22 6,699
2.73 0.14 80,412
Notes: Source: Ministero dellInterno; ISTAT.
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Table 2 Mayoral election outcomes
year obs. candidates min max win margin (%) min max
2002 733 3.00 1 11 32.48 0 100
2003 321 3.19 1 10 34.62 0 100
2004 4,319 2.57 1 14 39.65 0 100
2005 367 3.08 1 11 33.82 0 100
2006 1,161 2.70 1 12 36.52 0 100
2007 773 3.20 1 11 33.89 0 100
2008 425 3.31 1 14 34.14 0 100
2009 4,081 2.65 1 13 38.99 0 100
2010 461 3.03 1 9 34.97 0 100
2011 1,176 3.07 1 13 35.17 0 100
2012 777 3.65 1 16 36.82 0 100
2013 528 3.60 1 19 36.21 0 100
15,122 2.85 1 19 37.43 0 100
Notes: win margin = (vote di¤erence between the two most voted candidates/votes of the
elected mayor)*100; Source: Ministero dellInterno, electoral data.
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Table 3 Migration around elections
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5)
election(t-1,t-2)
0.0425
(0.0069)
election(t-1)
0.0330
(0.0084)
0.0372
(0.0089)
0.0387
(0.0098)
0.0157
(0.0127)
election(t-2)
0.0454
(0.0088)
0.0474
(0.0096)
0.0314
(0.0118)
election(t-3)
0.0105
(0.0103)
-0.0051
(0.0122)
election(t-4)
-0.0336
(0.0126)
year e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
municipality e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
observations 67,011 73,712 67,011 60,309 53,607
Notes: dependent variable = % out-migration. 6,702 municipalities. Standard errors in
parentheses. : p-value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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Table 4 Migration around elections: area-specic time trends
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5)
election(t-1,t-2)
0.0386
(0.0069)
election(t-1)
0.0310
(0.0084)
0.0310
(0.0089)
0.0291
(0.0098)
0.0181
(0.0126)
election(t-2)
0.0439
(0.0089)
0.0413
(0.0096)
0.0280
(0.0118)
election(t-3)
0.0091
(0.0103)
-0.0045
(0.0122)
election(t-4)
-0.0276
(0.0125)
North trend
-0.0346
(0.0021)
-0.0258
(0.0018)
-0.0347
(0.0021)
-0.0380
(0.0025)
-0.0382
(0.0029)
year e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
municipality e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
observations 67,011 73,712 67,011 60,309 53,607
Notes: dependent variable = % out-migration. North trend is a linear trend interacted
with a dummy variable equal to 1 for municipalities located in Northern Italy. 6,702 munici-
palities. Standard errors in parentheses. : p-value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value
< 0.10.
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Table 5 Migration around elections: regularly-spaced (5 years) elections only
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5)
election(t-1,t-2)
0.0394
(0.0070)
election(t-1)
0.0314
(0.0086)
0.0325
(0.0090)
0.0301
(0.0099)
0.0161
(0.0129)
election(t-2)
0.0443
(0.0090)
0.0419
(0.0098)
0.0262
(0.0120)
election(t-3)
0.0089
(0.0105)
-0.0074
(0.0124)
election(t-4)
-0.0316
(0.0128)
North trend
-0.0346
(0.0021)
-0.0260
(0.0018)
-0.0347
(0.0021)
-0.0380
(0.0025)
-0.0382
(0.0030)
year e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
municipality e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
observations 66,134 72,747 66,134 59,520 52,906
Notes: dependent variable = % out-migration. 6,702 municipalities. Standard errors in
parentheses. : p-value < 0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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Table 6 Migration determinants: electoral uncertainty
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5)
election(t+1)
-0.0329
(0.0094)
-0.0296
(0.0120)
-0.0249
(0.0119)
-0.0336
(0.0095)
-0.0279
(0.0094)
election(t)
-0.0006
(0.0091)
-0.0047
(0.0119)
-0.0050
(0.0117)
-0.0059
(0.0093)
-0.0066
(0.0091)
election(t-1)
0.0231
(0.0095)
0.0263
(0.0120)
0.0243
(0.0119)
0.0236
(0.0096)
0.0214
(0.0095)
large win(t+1)
-0.0061
(0.0141)
-0.0027
(0.0140)
large win(t)
0.0082
(0.0143)
0.0075
(0.0141)
large win(t-1)
-0.0063
(0.0143)
-0.0066
(0.0141)
uncontested(t+1)
0.0072
(0.0308)
0.0224
(0.0304)
uncontested(t)
0.1078
(0.0309)
0.1086
(0.0306)
uncontested(t-1)
-0.0141
(0.0309)
0.0148
(0.0306)
age 18-25
0.0295
(0.050)
0.0289
(0.0050)
age 26-35
0.0247
(0.0036)
0.0248
(0.0036)
age 46-55
-0.0519
(0.0037)
-0.0517
(0.0037)
age 56-65
-0.0593
(0.0040)
-0.0594
(0.0040)
age > 65
-0.0906
(0.0040)
-0.0907
(0.0040)
year e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
municipality e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
obs. 67,013 67,013 67,011 67,013 67,011
Notes: dependent variable = outmigration (%). Large win: di¤erence in votes between
the two most voted candidates exceeds the median 30% threshold of the votes earned by the
most voted candidate. 6,702 municipalities. Standard errors in parentheses. : p-value <
0.01; : p-value < 0.05; : p-value < 0.10.
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Figure1 The electoral migration cycle
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